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The Right to Education: Reconciling Teacher Tenure  
and the Current State of Public Education 
 




 The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that the administration and 
implementation of the public school system is the most important function of state and local 
governments. 1   Specifically, the Court’s unanimous ruling in Brown v. Board of Education 
emphasized education’s significance to a child’s potential success in life and the survival of any 
democratic society.2  The decision famously held, “[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”3  These 
words, though written by Chief Justice Earl Warren more than six decades ago, still hold true and 
reflect this country’s enormous investment of time, money, and effort in creating an education 
system with the goal of giving every child the tools necessary to succeed in life and ultimately 
foster our democracy. 
 Though its importance is rarely called into question, the level of constitutional protection 
offered to education has resulted in controversial judicial rulings.4  Some state courts elevate the 
right to education as a fundamental interest5, while the United States Supreme Court6 (the Supreme 
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1 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. (emphasis added). 
4 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (holding that education is not a 
fundamental right while emphasizing its high importance to society). 
5 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605 (Cal. 1971) (holding that education is a fundamental right). 
6 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59. 
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Court) and other state courts have declined to do so.7   Because those states and the federal 
government offer a lower level of equal protection analysis to education, statutes that allegedly 
detract from its quality must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.8  These 
decisions helped shape this country’s state and national education policy and, some argue, 
contributed to a deteriorating experience in the American classroom.9 
 Some of the most controversial legislation surrounding education policy is teacher tenure 
statutes.  Tenure is an employment protection awarded to teachers, the qualifications of which vary 
by state.10  Though the right to tenure does not technically create absolute immunity from dismissal, 
tenure reform advocates argue that some state statutes protect ineffective teachers from termination 
and thereby directly harm the quality of education.11  Overturning these statutes proves to be 
difficult, especially when state supreme courts offer education the lowest level of equal protection 
analysis.  
 In August of 2014, a California district court held that certain state teacher tenure statutes 
violate the California Constitution.12  In Vergara v. State of California, Judge Rolf Treu held that 
the challenged teacher tenure statutes detracted from the quality of California’s education and 
enjoined their enforcement.13  Because California considers education a fundamental right, state 
courts must apply the highest level of equal protection analysis. 14   Plaintiffs in New York 
                                                 
7 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 499 (N.J. 1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right). 
8 See, e.g., id at 499. 
9 See Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public Education, 22 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 49 (2011). 
10
 See Arnold Shep Cohen, Striking a Balance Between Teachers’ Employment Rights and Professional 
Responsibilities, 154 JUL N.J. LAW 43 (1993). (outlining various state laws regulating teacher tenure, including 
probationary periods and teacher effectiveness). 
11 See Nicholas Dagostino, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban Students from Teachers’ Unions, 
63 Ala. L. Rev. 177, 195 (2011). 
12 Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. August 27, 2014). 
13 Id. 
14 Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 606. 
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subsequently challenged state teacher tenure statutes in similar fashion.15  With the upcoming 
appeal of the Vergara decision and a trial scheduled in 2015 for Davids v. New York, it is important 
to analyze whether teacher tenure statutes detract from the quality of education and therefore 
violate a state’s constitution. 
 This Comment aims to answer those questions, examine the plaintiffs’ arguments in 
Vergara and Davids, and evaluate the effectiveness of New Jersey’s recent teacher tenure reform.  
Parts II and III of this Comment outline federal and state equal protection analysis and the level of 
protection education receives from the Supreme Court and the state courts in New Jersey, New 
York, and California.  Part IV examines the current landscape of teacher tenure in these states and 
explains Judge Treu’s analysis in the Vergara decision.  Part V then applies the plaintiffs’ 
arguments in Vergara and Davids to California and New York’s equal protection clauses.  
Ultimately, this Comment advocates for the courts to accept the plaintiffs’ arguments, overturn the 
states’ teacher tenure statutes and direct the California and New York legislatures to adopt an 
approach similar to New Jersey’s recent reform.  Part VI concludes.  
II. How Is Equal Protection Analyzed? 
A. Federal Equal Protection Analysis 
 Before evaluating the constitutional validity of current teacher tenure statutes as they relate 
to the right to public education, it is necessary to examine courts’ equal protection clause analysis.  
The Supreme Court has traditionally utilized a three-tiered test when legislation is challenged 
under the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause (the Equal Protection Clause).16  
First, laws that affect fundamental rights or classify individuals based on race and national origin 
                                                 
15 See Javier C. Hernandez, New York Teachers Fight Back on Attacks to Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/nyregion/new-york-educators-fight-back-on-attacks-to-tenure-.html. 
16 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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are subject to the highest level of scrutiny.17  Legislation that falls under this category must serve 
a compelling interest and the government action must be narrowly tailored to allow the violation 
of equal protection.18  Second, laws that classify individuals based on gender are traditionally 
analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.19  This analysis requires the law be substantially related to 
an important government interest.20  Finally, at a minimum, any statutory classification must be 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.21  All laws, whether passed by Congress or 
state legislatures, must meet this constitutional floor.22  Any law that fails to meet this “rational 
basis” standard violates the Equal Protection Clause and will be overturned.23 
B. New Jersey’s Equal Protection Analysis 
 Though the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis is highly influential, each state 
utilizes a unique approach to its respective state constitution’s equal protection clause.  The New 
Jersey Constitution’s Liberty Clause (the Liberty Clause) reads, “[a]ll persons are by nature free 
and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those enjoying 
and defending life and liberty, or acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and of pursuing 
and obtaining safety and happiness.”24  While there is no express mention of equal protection, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has read this article to grant equal protection under the law.25 
 When a statute is challenged under the Liberty Clause, the court departs from the three-
tiered federal analysis and opts for a balancing test that weighs the right violated against the need 
                                                 
17 See id. (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). 
18 Id. 
19 See id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).  
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17. 
22 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (U.S. 1959). 
23 See id. 
24 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
25 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006). 
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for the alleged inequality.26  In Greenberg v. Kimmelman, the New Jersey Supreme Court outlined 
this fluid balancing test where state courts must consider “[t]he nature of the affected right, the 
extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the 
restriction.”27  According to the court, this analysis uses an approach implicit in the federal test.28  
Justice Pollock explained, “in [federal] equal protection analysis, the nature of the right is the 
crucial consideration in characterizing a right as ‘fundamental’, the initial step in determining 
whether the governmental regulation will receive ‘strict scrutiny’ or a more relaxed standard of 
judicial review.”29  While the New Jersey Supreme Court’s test is less mechanical than the federal 
test, it still aims to define the importance of the right and analyze the level of protection that right 
receives from the Liberty Clause.  This guarantees protection against unequal treatment of people 
who should be treated alike, such as all students in the classroom.30 
C. California’s Equal Protection Analysis 
 Much like New Jersey, California applies a different equal protection analysis than its 
federal counterpart.  California’s equal protection clause is in-depth and reads more like a statute 
than a constitutional provision.31  Like the Equal Protection Clause, however, California’s equal 
protection clause still ensures that “[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws.”32  At its core, this article 
promises persons who are similarly situated are treated equally under the law.33 
                                                 
26 See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985). 
27 Id. 
28 See id. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 See CAL. CONST. art I, § 7 (In 1979, the California Legislature amended this provision to specifically outline how 
instruments of the state must enforce equal protection.  This clearly departs from New Jersey, New York, and the 
U.S. Constitution’s respective equal protection amendments, as it is much more in depth). 
32 See C.A. CONST. art I, § 7(a). 
33 In re Evans, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1263, 1270 (Cal Ct. App. 1996). 
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 The California Supreme Court has held that the state’s equal protection clause possesses 
independent validity from the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.34  When 
legislative action classifies individuals and is challenged as violating the state’s constitution, 
California courts have developed a two-tiered standard of review.35  The California Court of 
Appeals explained in Molar v. Gates that strict scrutiny analysis is required for the violation of 
fundamental interests or suspect classifications.36  The state must show that the violation of the 
right or the classification is necessary to accomplish a compelling interest.37  California does not 
recognize a distinction between classifications of race or gender.38  Instead, the state analyzes these 
classifications under the same level of scrutiny.39  All other legislation must bear some rational 
relationship to a legitimate state purpose, meeting the constitutional floor the U.S. Supreme Court 
requires.40 
D. New York’s Equal Protection Analysis 
 New York’s Constitution extends equal protection of state laws to all persons and prohibits 
the violation of an individual’s civil rights. 41   When statutes are challenged under this 
constitutional provision, the New York Court of Appeals opts to use an analysis that closely 
resembles the Supreme Court’s three-tiered test.42  First, strict scrutiny is appropriate in New York 
for an alleged discrimination based on suspect classification or violation of a fundamental 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d. 458, 469 (Cal. 1979). 
35 See, Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d. 1, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 See, e.g., Sail’er Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d. 1 (Cal. 1974) (holding that a California statute prohibiting women 
from obtaining bartender licenses compels the application of strict scrutiny analysis and ultimately violates the equal 
protection clause of the California Constitution). 
39 Id. 
40 Molar, 98 Cal. App. 3d. at 13. 
41 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11. 
42 See Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Schl. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y. 
1978). 
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interest.43   Second, in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, the New York Court of Appeals 
explained intermediate scrutiny, or the “sliding scale” test.44  The court first must ask if the alleged 
discrimination satisfies a substantial state interest and furthers a legitimate government purpose.45  
If the interest is served by the discrimination or violation of rights, the court must then answer if 
the objectives could be achieved by less offensive means.46  Third, similar to the federal analysis, 
all classifications must at least be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.47 
III. Is There a Right to an Education? 
A. The Guarantee of an Equal Education 
 The administration of public schools largely falls on state and municipal governments.48  
While some argue that the United States Department of Education has taken strides towards 
creating a national education policy,49 state constitutions, particularly New Jersey, California, and 
New York, require their respective legislatures provide free schooling to all children.50  The 
practical effect of this constitutional obligation has led to legislatures passing numerous statutes 
that regulate nearly every aspect of operating a statewide education system.51  These include 
mechanisms for funding each school district, education standards for student advancement, and 
evaluation criteria for teacher and administrative job performance.52  These statutes show that 
                                                 
43 Id. at 635. 
44 See Alevy v. Downstate Med. Ctr., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336 (N.Y. 1976). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638. 
48 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7 (1973). 
49 See Sarah G. Boyce, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake of the Federal Government’s 
Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1027 (2012). 
50 CAL. CONST. art. IX, §1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 1. 
51 See, e.g., School Funding Reform Act, N.J. STAT. Ann. § 18A:7F-44 (West 2008) (outlining the structure and 
calculations used to fund New Jersey’s public school system for all children between the ages of five and eighteen). 
52 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44830 (West 2009) (outlining the employment qualifications for public school teachers); 
see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-44; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3220 (McKinney 2008) (requiring all students to 
participate in physical fitness exams during the academic year). 
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education policy is, very much so, a state and local concern.  When individuals believe this 
legislation detracts from the state’s educational experience, the laws are challenged as violating 
the state’s guarantee of an education.53 
 Legal precedent in this area evaluates if government benefits or programs are elevated to 
fundamental rights.  States provide many services that its citizens need, some of which are 
mandated by the state constitution.54  For example, the New York Constitution requires the state 
legislature maintain a public welfare system in support of the needy.55  While this is certainly an 
important role for the government, the New York Court of Appeals has held that public welfare in 
not a fundamental right.56  Likewise, education is not elevated to a fundamental right in many 
states, and therefore receives a lower level of protection under a state’s equal protection clause.57  
But, as the Supreme Court explained, state laws that violate equal protection must always bear at 
least some rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.58  Therefore, in states where 
education is not a fundamental right, laws cannot go below this constitutional floor and detract 
from a basic level of education. 
 Many landmark judicial decisions regarding the administration of education have focused 
on state funding mechanisms.59  In New Jersey, California, and New York, the public school 
system is primarily funded by general revenue raised through property and income taxes.60  Those 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 (challenging the constitutionality of the education funding system in Texas). 
54 See N.Y. CONST. art XVII §1 (requiring the New York State Legislature to provide public support to the needy). 
55 Id. 
56 Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 651 (N.Y. 1982). 
57 See, e.g., id. (holding that education is not a fundamental right in New York). 
58 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (U.S. 1959). 
59 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (N.J. 1973) (challenging the constitutionality of the education funding 
system used in New Jersey). 
60 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8(requiring that state revenue be set aside for public school funding); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
18A:7F; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602 (McKinney 2014) (requiring public money be made available to each school 
district from state and local revenue). 
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opposed to the funding scheme have argued that poorer school districts do not have access to 
adequate tax revenue, resulting in an inferior educational experience that violates the state’s 
constitutional obligation and equal protection.61  Key cases from New Jersey, California, and New 
York are helpful to summarize for purposes of this Comment.  Each decision discussed infra 
outlines the obligation to provide an education and analyzes whether the respective constitutional 
provisions recognize a fundamental right.  This will ultimately provide a framework to discuss 
whether the challenged teacher tenure statutes violate the state constitution. 
B. The Supreme Court’s View 
 There is neither an explicit nor an implicit guarantee to education under the United States 
Constitution.62   The U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with this question in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.63   At trial, plaintiffs argued that the Texas public 
education financing system, through the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program (Program), 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.64  The Program was designed in response the development 
of industrial cities and population shifts, which resulted in many rural Texas communities lacking 
sufficient funding for public schools.65  The legislature understood disparities in expenditures 
harmed the quality of education in rural districts and passed legislation designed to increase 
funding.66  The Program supplied funds to school districts from general state revenue, which 
financed each district with roughly eighty percent of the annual school budget.67  The remaining 
funds came directly from the district’s budget by way of local property taxes, calculated as a 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1973). 
62 Id. at 35.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 9–10. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 11–12 
67 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11–12. 
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percentage of residential and commercial property value.68  The goal of the Program was twofold: 
(1) place the heaviest burden on school districts most capable of paying and (2) ensure that every 
school district contributes to the education of its children without completely exhausting local 
resources.69 
 The plaintiffs came from Edgewood, the least affluent district in the San Antonio area.70  
Because of low property values and limited municipal resources, the district could only contribute 
$26 to the education of each student for the 1967–1968 academic year.71  With the contribution 
from the Texas state revenue, total expenditures per student for the year were $248.72 At trial, 
plaintiffs introduced the 1967–1968 expenditures of Alamo Heights, the most affluent district in 
the San Antonio area.73  Because of greater property values and state contribution, Alamo Heights 
was able to supply $594 per pupil.74  The federal district court concluded the Program failed strict 
scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause on the basis that an individual’s wealth is a 
suspect classification and education is a fundamental right.75 
 The majority overturned the district court on two separate grounds.76  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Powell explained that plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the financing system 
discriminated against a definable group of impoverished people and led to a total lack of 
education.77  It was unclear to the majority if the Program discriminated against all poor people, 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69
 Id.   
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 12–13. 
72 Id. 
73 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12–13.  
74 Id. at 11–12.  
75 Id. at 16.  
76 Id. at 18.  
77 Id. at 23–25. 
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all people with lower property values, or the ten percent of Texas school districts surveyed for 
purposes of trial.78  The Court therefore concluded the financing system did not disadvantage a 
suspect class.79 
 The majority then held that education is not a fundamental right that requires a higher level 
of scrutiny.80  Justice Powell explained that education is vital in a free society, both to individual 
citizens and the country as a whole.81  The importance of a state function, however, does “not 
determine whether [that function] must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”82  Fundamental rights are afforded by a guarantee in the 
Constitution, while economic and social rights call for a lower level of scrutiny under equal 
protection analysis.83  Because it is not explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, the 




C. New Jersey’s View 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court confronted a similar public school funding issue in the 
same year as the Rodriguez decision. 85   In Robinson v. Cahill, plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of New Jersey’s public school financing plan.86  Much like Texas’ Program, New 
                                                 
78 Id. at 26–27. 
79 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.  
80 Id. at 29. 
81 Id. at 30.  
82 Id.  
83 See id. at 34–35.  
84 Id.  
85 See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (N.J. 1973). 
86 Id. at 480. 
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Jersey’s public schools received funding from general state revenue and local property taxes.87  
This resulted in a disparity of dollars spent per pupil, particularly in areas where property values 
were low.88  The plaintiffs argued this inequality violated a student’s fundamental right to an 
education, asking the court to overturn the funding scheme on the basis of the Liberty Clause.89 
 In addition to the guarantee of equal protection through the Liberty Clause, the New Jersey 
Constitution requires the legislature supply a “thorough and efficient” public school system to all 
children.90  Plaintiffs urged the court to invoke the highest level of scrutiny when evaluating the 
funding scheme’s violation of this constitutional provision.91  The plaintiffs specifically pointed to 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez that elevated explicit constitutional guarantees to the 
level of fundamental rights.92  The plaintiffs argued that the holding in Rodriguez only bolstered 
Chief Justice Warren’s unanimous decision in Brown, where the Court held “[s]uch an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”93 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court used the Rodriguez decision as a guide in its analysis and 
held the funding disparities neither violated a fundamental right nor invoked the highest level of 
scrutiny under the Liberty Clause.94  Chief Justice Weintraub explained that the guarantee of an 
efficient education does not mandate a uniform expenditure plan.95  The constitutional guarantee 
implicitly involves municipal participation, which undoubtedly leads to varying budgets and 
                                                 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 481. 
89 Id. at 482. 
90 N.J. CONST. art. VII § 4.  
91 Robinson, 623 N.J. at 496. 
92 Id. at 491. 
93 Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
94 See Robinson, 623 N.J. at 495. 
95 Id. at 499. 
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expenditures.96  While involvement at the state level is constitutionally mandated, the funding 
disparities that result from the statutory scheme are not “irrational” and do not invoke a higher 
level of scrutiny.97  Therefore, the requirement to furnish a service does not automatically elevate 
the state’s obligation to a fundamental right.98 
D. New York’s View 
 Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, New York’s public school funding scheme 
faced numerous challenges in the Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School Dist., Nassau 
County. v. Nyquist line of cases.99  Like New Jersey and Texas, New York’s funding scheme 
resulted in disparities where property values were low.100  In the case’s final disposition, the New 
York Court of Appeals looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez and ultimately held 
that education is not a fundamental right.101  Justice Jones explained that public education is one 
of the most important services the state performs, a notion expressly manifested in the New York 
State Constitution.102  As mentioned supra, however, dedication to a government program does 
not automatically elevate the level of scrutiny to that of a fundamental right. 103   Other 
constitutionally mandated programs, such as public assistance to the needy, are also highly 
important but do not call for a higher level of scrutiny.104   Strict or intermediate scrutiny is 
appropriate only when the state action groups persons together by reason of personal 
                                                 
96 Id. at 493–494. 
97 Id. at 499. 
98 Id.  
99 Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y. 1978), 
modified by Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. 
1981), modified by Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 
(N.Y. 1982). 
100 See Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 645. 
101 Id. at 651–652. 
102 N.Y. CONST. art XI §1; Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. 
103 Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. 
104 N.Y. CONST. art XVII §1; Nyquist 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. 
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characteristics, such as race or gender.105  For these reasons, the court held that the proper standard 
of review for purported violations of the right to education in New York is rational basis.106 
E. California’s View 
 California’s view of public education departs from the holdings in Rodriguez, Robinson, 
and Nyquist.107  In Serrano v. Priest, California’s public school funding statutes encountered a 
challenge for violating California’s equal protection clause.108  Similar to challenges in New York 
and New Jersey, plaintiffs attacked the statutes for creating funding disparities that resulted in 
substandard educational opportunities for students living in school districts with lower property 
values.109  The plaintiffs argued this violated a fundamental right.110 
 The California Supreme Court believed the plaintiffs’ claims had legal merit and remanded 
the proceedings for trial.111  Writing for the majority, Justice Sullivan held that the right to public 
education in California is a fundamental interest, requiring a higher level of scrutiny for an alleged 
violation.112  In support of this conclusion, the court pointed to Chief Justice Warren’s decision in 
Brown.113  Justice Sullivan explained that the majority in Brown espoused two themes when 
speaking about the importance of education: (1) the importance to individuals and (2) the 
importance to society. 114   Both of these themes directly impact the success of America’s 
democracy, and are supported by the language in California’s Constitution: “A general diffusion 
                                                 
105 Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. 
106 Id.  
107 See, e.g. Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 584 (Cal. 1971) 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 588. 
110 Id at 589. 
111 Id. at 618. 
112 Id. at 605–606. 
113 Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 606 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); 
Interestingly, Chief Justice Earl Warren served as Governor of California from 1943–1953. 
114 Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 606. 
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of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the 
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, 
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”115  Because of the “distinctive and priceless” role 
education serves in our society, the majority held that the right to education is a fundamental 
interest that requires the highest level of scrutiny and protection.116 
F. What Really Affects a Student’s Education? 
 The plaintiffs in the preceding cases attacked education funding plans in Texas, New Jersey, 
California, and New York. 117   With the exception of California, the courts largely rejected 
plaintiffs’ arguments that education deserves heightened constitutional protection.118  The courts 
held that disparities in funding do not violate a fundamental right, while recognizing education’s 
significance to society.119  As mentioned supra, education’s importance is exemplified by this 
country’s commitment of time, money, and effort in educating every child.  Even though it is not 
considered a fundamental right in every state, this commitment compels legislatures to ensure that 
laws governing education policy meet the required level of equal protection, even if that level is 
the “constitutional floor.”120  Laws that fail to meet the standard and detract from a student’s 
education must therefore be overturned.121 
                                                 
115 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 608. 
116 Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 608–609. 
117 San Antonio Indep.Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d 584; Robinson v. Cahill, 62 
N.J. 473 (N.J. 1973); Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 
(N.Y. 1982). 
118 Id. 
119 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 493 (N.J. 
1973); Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., Nassau Cnty. v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 651 (N.Y. 
1982). 
120 See Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (U.S. 1959). 
121 Id. 
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 Though funding is an important aspect of operating state public school systems, it is not 
the primary influence on education’s quality.122  For example, some statistics show that Newark, 
New Jersey spends about $22,000 per pupil, while only twenty-two percent of students graduate 
high school.123  In comparison, Chatham, New Jersey spends $11,000 per pupil and has a high 
school graduation rate of virtually 100%.124  Some may argue that comparing New Jersey’s largest 
city to a small suburb creates an inaccurate portrayal of Newark’s school system.  But the facts 
cannot be ignored: Newark, and many cities like it, spends huge sums of money on its public 
school system with extremely disappointing results.  Therefore other factors have as much, if not 
more, influence on a child’s education. 
 The Supreme Court has recognized some of these other factors that affect public 
education’s quality.125  In Brown, the Court famously struck down the segregation of children in 
public schools based on race.126  Even if facilities were “tangibly” equal, the psychological effect 
of separating students based on physical characteristics negatively impacts students’ education.127  
The Court therefore recognized that environmental factors have an impact on education’s 
quality.128 
 The Supreme Court also held that facilities and materials play an important role in 
education’s quality.129  In Sweatt v. Painter, the plaintiff was denied admission to the University 
of Texas Law School based on his race.130   Texas operated a law school solely for African 
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Americans, something that the Texas Court of Civil Appeals felt was an appropriate remedy for 
the plaintiff.131  The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the University of Texas to admit the 
plaintiff to its law school.132  In its analysis, the Court compared the schools’ facilities.133  The 
University of Texas had access to scholarship funds, moot court facilities, and 65,000 volumes in 
its library.134  The African American law school had no faculty, almost no volumes in its library, 
and lacked accreditation.135  The Court held that the insufficient facilities detracted from the 
plaintiff’s legal education and therefore violated his constitutional rights.136  Implicit in its decision, 
Painter recognizes that facilities and academic materials have an effect on one’s education.137 
 While funding, environmental factors, facilities and materials all play a vital role in a public 
school, effective teachers are the most important aspect of an education.138  A teacher has the most 
lasting impact on a student’s education, with some studies showing that students with effective 
teachers earn more money, are less likely to have children in their teens, and are nearly twice as 
likely to attend college.139  According to the same study, an ineffective teacher could result in 
almost $2.5 million of lost lifetime earnings.140  Providing the best teachers for students only seems 
logical with these results; however, some argue that teacher tenure statutes directly detract from 
this goal by protecting ineffective teachers’ positions.141  If teachers detract from the classroom 
experience and are protected from termination, then this may have constitutional implications even 
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at the lowest equal protection analysis.  This leads us to an important discussion about teacher 
tenure and its effect on the classroom experience. 
 IV. The Current Landscape of Teacher Tenure 
A. What is Tenure? 
 Tenure was initially established to provide protection from random termination and create 
a degree of permanency and expertise within the teaching profession.142  Tenure guarantees that 
an employee can only be dismissed for cause after a hearing is held and a decision is rendered by 
the state’s education agency.143  Contrary to popular belief, tenure for public school teachers is not 
absolute immunity from being terminated.144  As explained in Donahoo v. Board of Education, the 
goal of tenure is to ensure the best teachers continue service and are protected from termination 
based on arbitrary or capricious reasons.145  Proponents of tenure argue that this protection adds 
value to the classroom experience, while opponents believe it restricts the ability of administrators 
to effectively shape state education policies and standards.146  Laws regulating the hearing process 
vary by state; however, the charges an individual teacher may face for termination are less 
variable.147  Therefore, it is possible for a tenured teacher’s position to be terminated.148  
B. Efforts at Tenure Reform: The TEACHNJ Act 
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 The recent economic downturn, shrinking state budgets, and underperforming schools 
brought tenure reform to the forefront. 149   Many states passed legislation modifying teacher 
evaluations, extending the probationary period before teachers become tenure-eligible, and 
eliminating the highly controversial “last-in, first-out” seniority system utilized for school 
layoffs.150   New Jersey was not immune to these problems, and Republican Governor Chris 
Christie felt that tenure reform would help improve some of the state’s ailing school districts.151  
After a highly publicized fight between Governor Christie, the Democratic controlled legislature, 
and the New Jersey Education Association, all three eventually worked together to create the first 
comprehensive tenure reform in New Jersey since 1909.152 
 In 2012, New Jersey passed the New Jersey’s Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability 
for the Children of New Jersey (the “TEACHNJ Act”) for the 2013–2014 academic year.153  The 
TEACHNJ Act addresses the probationary period and evaluation process for public school 
teachers in New Jersey.154  As mandated by the law, teachers become eligible for tenure after one 
year of mentorship with an experienced teacher followed by two positive evaluations over the 
following three years.155  The new evaluation system rates teachers as “ineffective,” “partially 
effective,” “effective,” or “highly effective.” 156   A panel of experienced teachers and 
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administrators completes the evaluations, balancing both subjective and objective factors.157  Once 
tenure is earned, two consecutive years of an “ineffective” rating result in a loss of tenure.158  The 
teacher then must have two consecutive years of “effective” or “highly effective” ratings in order 
to avoid dismissal.159  Further, the costs of a dismissal hearing are capped at $7,500.160  According 
to supporters of the TEACHNJ Act, this allows administrators and state regulators to proceed 
against an ineffective teacher without being discouraged by expensive and ongoing litigation, a 
problem that existed before the law’s passage.161 
C. Legal Challenges Brought Against Teacher Tenure 
a. Vergara v. The State of California 
 The same year New Jersey passed the TEACHNJ Act, tenure reformers in California 
mounted a legal battle in Vergara v. California.162  The plaintiffs challenged five statutes from the 
California Education Code that allegedly violated the equal protection clause of the California 
Constitution. 163   The statutes included California Education Code: (1) §44929.21(b) (the 
“Permanent Employment Statute”); (2) §44934 and §44938(b)(1)-(2) (“Dismissal Statutes”); and 
(3) §44955 (“Last-In, First-Out Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”).164  The plaintiffs argued that each 
statute protected ineffective teachers from dismissal, which contributed to a failing education 
system within their respective school districts.165  Because education is considered a fundamental 
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right in California the plaintiffs believed the statutes failed under the strict scrutiny analysis and 
violated the guarantee of equal protection under the California Constitution.166 
 Arguing before Judge Treu, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the Permanent 
Employment Statute disadvantaged both students and competent teachers.167  As mandated by the 
statute, teachers are informed of their tenure status at the end of a two-year probationary period.168  
In practice, the decision must be communicated by March 15 of the second year, three months 
before the end of the academic term.169  This requires administrators make the actual decision well 
before the March 15 deadline.170  The teacher simultaneously undergoes a credentialing process 
during the first two years of employment; however, that decision cannot be made until the actual 
expiration of the second academic term.171  The inconsistency can, and has, resulted in a district’s 
having a tenured teacher without state credentials.172  Plaintiffs also presented evidence that if 
there was any doubt of a teacher’s ability, time constraints forced administrators to make a tenure 
decision without adequate opportunity for the teacher to prove competence.173 
 Judge Treu held that this statute unfairly affected both students and teachers.174  Because 
education is considered a fundamental right in California, the state must offer a compelling reason 
for students to be deprived of potentially competent teachers and for teachers to not have enough 
time to prove their abilities within the classroom.175  Judge Treu found that the state failed its 
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burden and held the Permanent Employment Statute violated the equal protection clause of the 
California Constitution.176 
 Judge Treu also found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the equal protection clause of 
the California Constitution.177  Plaintiffs presented evidence that a California dismissal hearing 
may take up to ten years and will cost a school district between $50,000 and $450,000.178  During 
trial, defense witnesses admitted that was is nearly “impossible” to terminate a tenured teacher’s 
position under the current statutory scheme.179  The state argued that a teacher, or any public 
employee, is entitled to due process during a dismissal hearing, making the Dismissal Statutes 
necessary.180   
 Judge Treu agreed that due process is a right, but explained that other certified school 
employees must only be made aware of their dismissal charges and be given the right to respond 
at a hearing. 181   Judge Treu found no compelling reason to give teachers extra due process 
protections afforded by the challenged statutes, particularly when the result keeps ineffective 
teachers employed.182  While teachers, and other public employees, have a right to due process, 
this right cannot detract from the fundamental right afforded to California’s students.183  For these 
reasons, the court found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an 
education and the state’s equal protection clause.184 
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 Lastly, Judge Treu found the LIFO Statutes resulted in extreme “classroom disruption” and 
agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the provision violated a student’s constitutional rights.185  
When school layoffs are necessary, the LIFO Statutes regulates teacher dismissals.186  The last-
hired teacher is the first dismissed, without consideration of the teacher’s quality or 
effectiveness.187  Judge Treu explained the defendants would need to present a compelling reason 
for the “de facto retention of incompetent [teachers]” in order to defend the LIFO Statutes’ 
existence.188  Judge Treu found the logic of the defendant’s position to be “unfathomable”.189  
California recognizes education as a fundamental right that requires the highest level of equal 
protection analysis. 190   Automatically keeping ineffective teachers in the classroom directly 
impacts education’s quality, violating students’ constitutional rights.191  For these reasons, Judge 
Treu held the LIFO Statutes failed strict scrutiny analysis.192 
b. Davids v. The State of New York 
 Shortly after Judge Treu decided Vergara, two separate lawsuits were filed in New York 
challenging the state’s teacher tenure statutes.193  In Wright v. New York and Davids v. New York, 
plaintiffs submitted complaints arguing that thirteen New York Education Law statutes keep 
ineffective teachers in the classroom and infringe upon a student’s fundamental right to a sound 
and basic education.194  Similar to the tenure provisions in Vergara, the plaintiffs in Wright and 
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Davids challenged New York Education Laws: (1) §2509, §2573, and §3012 (“Permanent 
Employment Statutes”); (2) §3020 ( “Dismissal Statutes”); and (3) §2585 and §3013 ( “Last-In, 
First-Out Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”).195  Because the two lawsuits have similar arguments 
against the same statutes, Judge Phillip Minardo granted the New York Attorney General’s motion 
to consolidate the cases.196  With a trial date currently set for early 2015, plaintiffs will now argue 
solely under Davids v. New York.197 
V. Do the Challenged Tenure Statutes Violate a Right to Education? 
 The plaintiffs in Vergara will have their arguments tested in an upcoming appeal, while 
the plaintiffs in Davids must argue in a state that offers education the lowest level of equal 
protection analysis.198  Both New York and California have recognized education’s importance 
and the integral role teachers play in a child’s academic development.199  The courts, therefore, 
must determine if the challenged teacher tenure statutes detract from a student’s education and 
survive the state’s equal protection analysis. 
 
A. California Should Uphold Vergara 
 Tenure reform advocates viewed the Vergara decision as a victory, while teacher unions 
across the nation accused Judge Treu of blaming teachers for failing educational institutions.200  In 
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response to the court’s opinion, California Governor Jerry Brown appealed the decision, 
explaining, “[c]hanges of this magnitude, as a matter of law and policy, require appellate 
review.” 201   As explained supra, the California Supreme Court has held that education is a 
fundamental right.202  This affords students the highest level of scrutiny under equal protection 
analysis, requiring a violation of that right be necessary and narrowly tailored to accomplish a 
compelling interest.203  Further, teachers are the most important aspect of a student’s education.204  
An effective teacher leads to the heightened possibility of personal and professional success.205  
While teacher tenure is certainly good public policy in order to ensure some level of employment 
protection and expertise in the profession, there is no compelling reason for that protection to 
infringe upon a fundamental right, particularly when the effects on a student are potentially 
disastrous.  For this reason, the appellate division of the superior court should uphold the decision 
in Vergara and force the California legislature to reform state teacher tenure statutes. 
 California’s Permanent Employment Statute, Dismissal Statutes, and LIFO Statute violate 
the California Constitution and conflict with tenure’s goal of providing a level of expertise within 
the profession.206  The plaintiffs’ evidence shows that a teacher: (1) is granted tenure after an 
inadequate amount of time; (2) is afforded due process protection that makes it nearly impossible 
to be dismissed; and (3) is automatically protected during school layoffs regardless of the teacher’s 
quality or effectiveness.207  This creates a system where ineffective teachers are granted tenure and 
are protected from termination. 
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 The Permanent Employment Statue forces administrators to evaluate a teacher’s 
effectiveness in an inadequate time period.208  In practice, the statute uses one full academic year 
as the primary criteria for granting tenure.209  Dr. John Deasy, Superintendent of the Los Angeles 
School District, testified that the mandated time period is insufficient to determine tenure 
eligibility. 210   Both the plaintiffs and defendants offered evidence that a three to five year 
probationary period would be better suited to evaluate a teacher’s abilities.211  As mentioned supra, 
administrators use only one full year of evaluations to determine a teacher’s eligibility for 
tenure.212  Because of the short timeframe, the Permanent Employment Statute creates a possibility 
that ineffective teachers are granted tenure. The results ultimately detract from California’s 
education, harm students and violate the state’s equal protection clause. 
 The Dismissal Statutes discourage administrators from pursuing the termination of an 
ineffective teacher due to the unnecessarily heightened due process procedures.213  The plaintiffs 
submitted evidence that a dismissal proceeding can cost upwards of $450,000, and defense 
witnesses testified that the termination of a tenured teacher is “extremely rare.”214  The high cost 
of litigation caused by the mandated process discourages administrators from pursuing a 
dismissal.215  This only protects ineffective teachers and detracts from education in California.   
 The LIFO Statutes are another example of California’s protection of ineffective teachers.  
When layoffs occur, no weight is given to a teacher’s effectiveness or abilities; rather, seniority is 
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the sole criterion used for dismissals.216  This conceivably could lead to a situation where a highly 
effective teacher with ten years of experience is dismissed instead of an ineffective teacher with 
eleven years of experience.  The defendants could not offer a logical reason why such a system 
should exist.217  As explained by Judge Treu, the defendants’ position requires them to argue that 
a competent teacher’s position should be terminated over an ineffective teacher’s simply because 
of his or her hire date.218  As with the Permanent Employment Statute and Dismissal Statutes, the 
LIFO Statute detracts from the quality of education and violates equal protection in California. 
 Under California’s strict scrutiny analysis, the defendants fail to show the challenged 
statutes are necessary for a compelling state interest.219  The legislature’s goal to protect teacher 
employment cannot trump the constitutional obligation to provide all students with an education, 
particularly when the quality of education is negatively impacted.  Granting tenure to ineffective 
teachers, and subsequent protection from dismissal, violates a fundamental right and detracts from 
expertise within the profession.  The challenged statutes, therefore, violate the equal protection 
clause of California’s Constitution and directly undermine tenure’s goals.  For these reasons, the 
appellate court should uphold Judge Treu’s decision and overturn the statutes. 
B. The Current NY Statutes Should Be Overturned  
 As mentioned supra, the Court of Appeals of New York held in Nyquist that education is 
not a fundamental right.220  Therefore, an alleged violation under the state’s equal protection clause 
need only be rationally related to an important government interest.221  In Campaign for Fiscal 
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Equity v. New York, the court established the constitutional floor that needs to be met in order for 
the legislature to meet its obligation to provide an education.222  Judge Pigott explained that 
schools must teach “the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children 
to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury.”223  
In order for the plaintiffs in Davids to succeed, they must demonstrate a causal connection between 
the challenged statutes and a failure to provide students with a sound and basic education.224  If 
the court finds the statutes serve a legitimate government interest, the plaintiffs will ultimately 
fail.225 
 The plaintiffs in Davids outline tenure’s effect on education in New York and argue that 
the state’s Permanent Employment Statutes, Dismissal Statutes, and LIFO Statutes violate a 
student’s right to a sound education.226  Much like California’s challenged statutes, the plaintiffs 
offered evidence that the evaluation process for granting tenure is inadequate, that high litigation 
costs discourage administrators from dismissing ineffective teachers, and that seniority is the only 
factor considered during school layoffs.227  Plaintiffs argue that effective teachers are the primary 
“input” of a sound education, explaining that “students taught by an effective teacher are more 
likely to attend college, earn higher salaries, reside in higher quality neighborhoods, and save for 
retirement.”228  Because the challenged statutes keep ineffective teachers in the classroom, they 
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directly contribute to the legislature’s failure to provide a basic education.229   Therefore, the 
plaintiffs’ rights under the New York Constitution are violated.230  
 Plaintiffs argue New York’s Permanent Employment Statutes ensure that ineffective 
teachers are almost guaranteed tenure.231   Tenure is conferred to a teacher after two, annual 
performance evaluations during a three-year probationary period. 232   Administrators use the 
Annual Professional Performance Review (“APPR”) to evaluate performance.233  Teachers are 
rated as “Highly Effective,” “Effective,” “Developing,” or “Ineffective.”234  Student academic 
growth accounts for twenty percent of a teacher’s rating, while in-class observation and local 
achievement metrics account for the remaining eighty percent. 235   Plaintiffs argue that the 
inadequate probationary period and the APPR’s focus on subjective factors result in ineffective 
teachers earning tenure. 236   An administrator cannot reasonably determine the long-term 
effectiveness of a teacher within three years, an the focus of teacher evaluations should not be 
reliant on subjective factors.237  In 2012, for example, 91.5% of New York teachers were rated as 
“Highly Effective” or “Effective,” while only 31% of students met standardized test proficiency 
in English and Mathematics.238  These results do not support the position that students are being 
provided a basic education under the standard established in Fiscal Equity.239  If the plaintiffs can 
                                                 
229 Complaint, supra note 227, at 6 
230 Complaint, supra note 227, at 6. 
231 Complaint, supra note 227, at 9 (explaining that in 2007, 97% of eligible teachers received tenure). 
232 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2509, 2573, 3012 (McKinney 2014); Complaint, supra note 227, at 9. 
233 Complaint, supra note 227, at 10. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 11. 
237 Id at 12–13. 
238
 Cathy Woodruff, Why Are Most Teachers Rated Effective When Most Students Test Below Standards?, N.Y. 
STATE SCHOLL BOARDS ASSOCIATION (Dec. 16, 2013), http ://www.nyssba.org/news/2013/12/12/on-board-online-
december-16-2013/why-are-most-teachers-rated-effective-when-most-students-test-below-standards/.) 
239 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 828 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (N.Y. 2006). 
 31 
show that the Permanent Employment Statutes inadequately rate teachers and directly harm 
education, the statute will likely fail under the rational basis test. 
 Plaintiffs also claim that the Dismissal Statutes require a number of unnecessary hurdles to 
be cleared before a teacher’s employment is terminated, leaving ineffective teachers in the 
classroom. 240  New York’s public employees are afforded due process rights before being 
dismissed.241  An employer must provide notice and the right to respond before the termination is 
effective.242  According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the Dismissal Statutes provide teachers in New 
York with “super due process” that results in years of expensive litigation.243  One study cited in 
the complaint concluded that the average dismissal costs $313,000 and can last two and a half 
years.244  This discourages administrators from even attempting to remove a tenured teacher.245  
Because this results in ineffective teachers remaining in New York classrooms, the statute will 
most likely fail to meet the constitutional floor established by courts. 
 Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that the LIFO Statutes protect ineffective teachers from facing 
dismissal and harm students’ right to a sound and basic education.246  The New York LIFO Statutes 
require administrators to only consider seniority as the determinant for dismissal when school 
layoffs are necessary.247  No consideration is given to teacher quality or effectiveness.248  As 
mentioned earlier, tenure’s goal is to retain a level of expertise within the profession.  The LIFO 
Statutes also offer employment protection to effective teachers who have seniority.  This obviously 
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adds to the quality of education in New York.  An automatic protection for senior teachers, 
however, is not the only way to achieve this goal.  The defendants in Davids will need to argue 
that ineffective teachers with seniority should remain employed over more junior effective teachers 
during school layoffs.249  This position is untenable.  Because the LIFO Statutes keep ineffective 
teachers in the classroom, the quality of education is negatively affected and ultimately violates 
the state constitution.250 
 Though New York offers the right to education the lowest level of equal protection analysis, 
the court in Davids should overturn the Permanent Employment Statutes, Dismissal Statutes, and 
LIFO Statutes.251  Plaintiffs offered much evidence to suggest the challenged statutes fail to meet 
the constitutional floor described in Fiscal Equity.252  Because education is not a fundamental right, 
legislation affecting its quality needs only to serve a legitimate government interest; however it 
still must meet this constitutional floor.253  While providing job security to teachers adds to the 
expertise within the profession, the current legislation in New York is not the best way to meet 
this goal.  Keeping ineffective teachers in the classroom only hurts students and does not fulfill 
the legislature’s obligation to provide a sound and basic education.  For these reasons, the court in 
Davids should find the challenged statutes unconstitutional and direct the legislature to reform 
state tenure laws.  
C. Balancing Tenure and Education 
 Though it has only been in effect for one full academic year, the TEACHNJ Act is an 
example of how California and New York can balance job protection, state equal protection 
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requirements and the state’s obligation to provide an education.254  The law ensures that earning 
tenure in New Jersey is no longer a rubberstamp process, where the only requirement is surviving 
a three-year probationary period.255  The law requires a more thoughtful evaluation of a teacher’s 
skills and training throughout four years. 256   The evaluations are regulated by uniform state 
standards and are administered by various education experts and professionals.257  Once tenure is 
earned, the benefit is not conferred for life.258  Teachers who fail to remain effective throughout 
their careers may lose tenure, however, this does not happen immediately.259  The teacher has two 
years to prove his or her effectiveness in the classroom after tenure is lost.260  This balances the 
employment interests of teachers and allows the state to provide students with the best possible 
educators. 
 New Jersey’s approach would most likely pass the constitutional standards of both 
California and New York while positively contributing to each state’s ailing school districts.  
California and New York approach the constitutional obligation to education differently; however, 
each state’s high court recognizes education’s importance.261  Because teachers have the most 
influence on a student’s education, legislatures must ensure that the most effective teachers remain 
in the classroom.262   New Jersey’s tenure model serves both California’s high constitutional 
standard and New York’s requirement to provide a “sound and basic” education.263  Instituting a 
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comprehensive evaluation process and protecting effective teachers only adds to the educational 
experience, protects student’s rights, and fulfills California’s and New York’s commitment to 
providing an education to their students.  
VI. Conclusion 
 State and federal courts have consistently recognized education’s importance to society.264  
While each jurisdiction has differing views of the constitutional obligation to provide an education, 
New York, New Jersey and California agree that there is a level of education that must be available 
to all students.265  Even at the lowest level of equal protection analysis, state courts and legislatures 
are obligated to ensure that laws bear some rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.  
When teacher tenure statutes interfere with the classroom experience and create disruption in a 
student’s learning environment, those laws fail both strict scrutiny and rational basis review and 
therefore must be changed. For these reasons, the challenged teacher tenure statutes in California 
and New York should be overturned and a new statutory scheme, like the TEACHNJ Act, should 
be instituted. 
                                                 
264 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973); see Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 499 
(N.J. 1973). 
265 Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 606; Robinson, 623 N.J. at 499; Campaign for Fiscal Equity 828 N.Y.S.2d at 238. 
